DRC signs $2.3bn cobalt and lithium mining expansion with Chinese firms as US warns on critical minerals security

The Democratic Republic of Congo signed a $2.3 billion agreement with Chinese firms on Tuesday to expand cobalt and lithium mining operations in the country’s copper-cobalt belt, according to regional reports. The deal aims to increase production of battery minerals, with Chinese companies already controlling about half of the DRC’s cobalt output, officials said.

The $2.3 billion agreement signed Tuesday expands existing Chinese-operated mining projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s copper-cobalt belt, officials said. The deal targets increased production capacity for cobalt and lithium, both critical for battery manufacturing. The investment is part of a broader pattern of Chinese reinvestment and state-backed financing in Congolese mining, with Chinese lenders having directed nearly $30 billion in transition-mineral financing to the DRC and Peru between 2000 and 2021.

Chinese firms currently control about half of the DRC’s cobalt output, operating eight of the country’s 14 largest cobalt mines, according to research cited by regional analysts.

Chinese state-owned and state-linked companies such as China Railway Group and Sinohydro dominate the mining sector in the DRC, holding major stakes in ventures like Sicomines, sources confirmed. Three large mining sites, including Tenke Fungurume and Sicomines, account for 42% of all Chinese state-backed lending and grants in the DRC from 2008 to 2022, amounting to about $11 billion of the total $24.3 billion. These firms focus on upstream extraction to supply Chinese-controlled midstream refining and battery manufacturing operations. China controls the majority of global cobalt refining capacity, meaning much of the cobalt ore mined in the DRC is processed in Chinese refineries, according to industry reports.

The DRC government has recently sought to renegotiate mining agreements to increase its share of profits. The Council on Foreign Relations reported in early 2025 that Kinshasa plans to raise its stake in a cobalt and copper joint venture with Sinohydro and China Railway Group from 32% to 70%. At the same time, the government is engaged in preliminary talks with the United States on a potential “minerals-for-security” agreement that would grant the U.S. greater access to Congolese cobalt, copper, and lithium in exchange for military support against armed groups such as M23 in eastern DRC, according to diplomatic sources. These parallel negotiations indicate Kinshasa’s strategy to diversify its partnerships and leverage its mineral resources for both economic and security benefits.

U.S. officials have expressed concerns over China’s dominant role in the DRC’s critical minerals sector. Analysts warn that Chinese control over cobalt and lithium supply chains poses risks to global supply security and geopolitical stability. Washington views Chinese firms’ influence as creating a “silent cartel” that could affect pricing and availability of battery metals crucial for electric vehicles and clean-energy technologies. U.S. national security assessments also highlight labor and human-rights issues in Congolese mines linked to Chinese operators, including reports of child labor and forced labor in parts of the cobalt supply chain. These concerns partly drive the ongoing U.S.–DRC negotiations aimed at securing ethically sourced minerals outside of Chinese intermediaries.

The DRC holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves and is the dominant global producer, making its mining agreements pivotal to the global battery supply chain. Chinese creditors have supported numerous mining projects in the DRC, helping establish the country as a key destination for state-directed lending in transition minerals. Nearly half of the DRC’s cobalt production is controlled by Chinese companies, reinforcing China’s strategic position in the global market. Although the DRC’s lithium sector is less developed than those of Australia or Chile, Chinese-backed exploration and expansion efforts aim to rapidly scale up lithium output alongside cobalt and copper, contributing to Beijing’s broader critical-minerals diversification strategy.

Infrastructure development often accompanies Chinese-backed mining deals in the DRC, with financing for roads, power lines, and other projects repaid through future mineral exports, as seen in the Sicomines project. Satellite imagery and open-source analyses of Lualaba province reveal rapid expansion of Chinese-operated cobalt and copper mines, including growing pits and processing facilities, underscoring the scale of these investments. Governance challenges persist, with civil society groups calling for greater contract transparency, improved revenue sharing, and stronger environmental and labor oversight. U.S. congressional hearings have documented hazardous working conditions and informal artisanal mining linked to cobalt supply chains involving Chinese buyers or operators.

China’s involvement in the DRC is part of a wider China–Africa minerals axis, where Beijing has provided nearly $57 billion in loans and grants to 19 Belt and Road countries for extraction and processing of copper, nickel, lithium, cobalt, and rare earths. Across Africa, China promotes itself as a partner in the clean-energy transition, signing resource and energy deals alongside critical-mineral projects. Chinese critical-mineral strategy relies on state-directed finance, long-term offtake agreements, and acquisition of key assets along the supply chain, enabling dominance not only in mining but also in processing and downstream battery manufacturing. Western governments, including the United States and European states, are pursuing diversification strategies and partnerships with producers like the DRC to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled supply chains.

The $2.3 billion expansion deal thus reflects the intersection of resource security, industrial policy, and great-power competition, with the DRC’s cobalt and emerging lithium sector becoming a focal point for both Chinese and U.S. strategic agendas.